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nullify any judgment as a determination of personal liability on
a discharged debt; and to enjoin creditors from suing on, or using
any process to collect, a discharged debt.
Promise to Pay Discharged Debt
In Louisiana, 0 and generally, a new promise to pay a debt
discharged in bankruptcy is actionable without new considera-
tion;81 and giving a new note for a discharged debt amounts to
such a promise.8 2 In Port Finance Co. v. Daigle,85 the debtor
signed a new note and the creditor gave new consideration, but
the debtor had been coerced into signing, or so the jury believed.
In reversing a judgment for defendant, the court of appeal held,
over a vigorous dissent, that the evidence did not support the
verdict.
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Robert A. Pascal*
Alimony
de Lavergne v. de Lavergne1 presents a fascinating problem
evoking meditation on the bases of "conflict of laws" rules. A
wife domiciled in Louisiana sued ex parte in Louisiana for a
judgment of separation from bed and board from her husband
domiciled in France. In the same suit she asked for alimony
according to Louisiana law. The defendant husband not being
present in the state or expected to appear voluntarily, the plain-
tiff wife, treating her cause of action for alimony as one for
money, proceeded quasi in rem by attaching the defendant hus-
band's beneficial interest in a Louisiana trust. A judgment for
alimony in the amount of $600 monthly followed, but no attempt
was made to enforce payments until $5400 was due. The wife
then asked for and received a judgment ordering execution of
the whole out of the husband's beneficial interest in trust at-
tached on the commencement of suit. The husband thereupon
alleged the nullity of the original alimony judgment, contending
that a suit for alimony is not one "for money" which might be
30. Irwin v. Hunnewell, 207 La. 422, 21 So.2d 485 (1945).
31. 1A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.33 (1971).
32. Booty v. Amer. Fin. Corp., 224 So.2d 512 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
33. 236 So.2d 256 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 244 So.2d 698 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
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initiated quasi in rem. It is assumed that the husband's conten-
tion was essentially that a proceeding quasi in rem may be used
only to enforce an obligation existing before the filing of suit,
and not to determine an obligation which will commence only
from the moment of the initiation of the suit. Both the trial
court and the court of appeal upheld the judgment, citing Lou-
isiana Code of Civil Procedure articles 9 and 3542. The appli-
cability of Louisiana legislation to determine the husband's lia-
bility for alimony was not questioned.
The writer does not offer any opinion whether the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure is properly construed to permit suits
for alimony through quasi in rem proceedings. Assuming that
this legislation is to be so construed, the question which remains
is whether it is within the state's competence to enact such legis-
lation. In the writer's opinion, this is a question which cannot
be determined authoritatively by a self-serving state declaration
of competence; it must be answered according to reasonable cri-
teria for delineating the judicial competences of states. Similarly,
the applicability of Louisiana legislation to determine the hus-
band's liability for alimony is not to be assumed, but is to be
determined by reasonable criteria for the legislative competences
of states. Under the United States Constitution's full faith
and credit clause, the authoritative determination of the reason-
able criteria for both the legislative and the judicial competences
of States of the Union, among themselves at least, belongs pri-
marily to Congress.2 The criteria for both competences, there-
fore, are federal questions." If the Congress has not made the
determination itself, then the federal judiciary must have the
authority to decide what these criteria are. 4 It follows, there-
2. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each
state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other
state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which
such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof."3. Thus Klaxcn Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941),
which declares the determination of "choice of law" rules (criteria for the
legislative competences of states) to be a matter of state law, Is necessarily
unconstitutional and should be overruled.
The ultimate determination of the criteria for Interstate judicial com-
petence, however, has not been left to the states, the United States Supreme
Court always controlling this matter under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment and the full faith and credit clause itself.
4. If the full faith and credit clause requires each state to give full
recognition and effect to every other state's laws and judgments, regardless
of content and circumstances, then it makes each state the slave of every
other. This could not have been the plan of rational men. It must be con-
cluded, therefore, that the full faith and credit clause intended to obligate
each state to give full recognition and effect to only those laws and judg-
[Vol. 32
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fore, that state legislation or decisions prescribing or adopting
particular criteria for state legislative and judicial competences
cannot be viewed as more than attempts to provide judgments,
in the absence of federal determinations, on what these criteria
might be. These state rules must stand the test of federal ap-
proval.
The legislative competence of a state to impose alimony
liability on a non-domiciliary in favor of a domiciliary usually
has been assumed, but it is submitted that it cannot stand the
test of the full faith and credit clause. The imposition on a non-
domiciliary of alimony liability in excess of that imposed by the
state in which he chooses to live as a citizen violates the right
of the domiciliary state to determine the limits of the alimentary
obligations of its own citizens. The same rule should apply as
well to persons domiciled in other countries, even if the full
faith and credit clause is not considered extendable to deline-
ations of jurisdiction between states and foreign countries, for
there would seem to be every reason to treat the situations simi-
larly. In the same way, Louisiana should not be considered en-
titled to demand more alimony for its citizens than Louisiana
would give them under its own laws. Thus, in the instant case
it is suggested that the alimentary obligation of the husband, a
French domiciliary, should have been determined to be the lesser
of the obligations imposed by the Louisiana and French laws.5
On the issue of state judicial competence, or state juris-
diction to hear the suit, the writer suggests that Pennoyer v.
Neff6 long has been overruled in principle, if not expressly or
ments of other states enacted and rendered within the scope of their legis-
lative and judicial competences. This in turn implies criteria by which the
legislative and judicial competences of states may be determined. The Con-
gress is given the right to prescribe such criteria by being given the right
to determine the effect to be given sister state laws and judgments; but the
Congress is not compelled to exercise its faculty, and yet full faith and
credit must be given even if Congress has not exercised it. In that event
the criteria have to be found in reasonable custom or reasonable judgment,
and the authoritative determination thereof ultimately has to be made by
the United States Supreme Court inasmuch as full faith and credit is a rule
of the United States Constitution.
5. The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law as enacted in
Louisiana moves in this direction by specifying that the measure of the
"duty of support" shall be that of "any state where the obligor was [is?]
present during the period for [in?] which support is sought." LA. R.S.
13:1661 (1950) as amended, La. Acts. 1966, No. 288, § 1. Presence, in the
writer's opinion, cannot be considered a reasonable criterion for legislative
competence in alimony matters and therefore offends the full faith and
credit clause; but at least the provision indicates that the law of the domi-
cile of the plaintiff is not to determine the defendant's obligation.
6. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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in all of its applications, and that today the fundamental issue
is the reasonableness under the circumstances of permitting one
to prosecute a suit against a non-domiciliary defendant, assum-
ing adequate notice and perhaps the appointment of an attorney
to represent the absentee. The writer believes it is eminently
reasonable to allow alimony suits in personam against non-domi-
ciliary defendants to be prosecuted in the plaintiff's state of
domicile. Having a spouse or ex-spouse in possible need in a
state is as much reason to consider the non-domiciliary subject to
in personam suit there, for the purpose of ascertaining whether
alimony is due, as is "doing business," "using the highways and
causing injury or damage," or the host of other criteria used in
other kinds of situations.7
On the other hand, the writer believes proceedings quasi in
rem are intrinsically inappropriate to determine alimony lia-
bility for the future. A quasi in rem suit presupposes a claim
resolvable in a money judgment, and a demand for alimony is
certainly reducible to that; but to permit this procedure in in-
stances in which the judgment cannot be executed completely
as soon as rendered leads to difficulties. As Professor Woody of
the Tulane Law School observed accurately in a note on de
Lavergne,8 for a quasi in rem judgment for future alimony to be
truly effective the judgment debtor would have to be forbidden
to regain control of the assets attached even if at the moment
not a single alimony installment were due. Professor Woody
apparently favors legislation adopting such a rule.9 The writer
politely dissents, believing that such a rule should be judged in
unreasonable restraint of one's use of his assets before he has
defaulted in his obligation.
CRIMINAL LAW
Frederick W. Ellis*
Dangerous Weapon
In State v. Levi' the court held that an unloaded and in-
7. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 86-92 (for a
summary treatment) and 93-139 (for greater detail) (1971). See also Ander-
son, Using Long-Arm Jurisdiction to Enforce Marital Obligations, 11 J. or
FAMILY L. 67 (1971).
8. Woody, A New Alimony Remedy?, 19 LA. B.J. 151 (1971).
9. Id. at 156.
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 259 La. 591, 250 So.2d 751 (1971). For a different view on this case,
[Vol. 32
